Enhancing Communication Between Scientists, Government Officials, and the Lay Public: Advancing Science and Protecting the Public\u27s Welfare through Better Multi-Stakeholder Interfacing by Lee, Clark J. et al.
Enhancing Communication Between Scientists,
Government Officials, and the Lay Public:
Advancing Science and Protecting the Public's
Welfare through Better Multi-Stakeholder
Interfacing
Clark J. Lee, JD,* Patrick P. Rose, PhD**
& Earl Stoddard III, PhD, MPH***
I. INTRODUCTION
Science long has existed as a continuing quest for knowledge and
advancement to improve the human condition. Where this quest
approaches the "cutting-edge" limits of human experience, inherent risks
and dangers arise both for the scientists conducting the research and the
communities in which the research is performed. Protecting public welfare
from health and safety threats is one of the fundamental responsibilities of
government. Because most scientists believe that their research should be
conducted without interference from codes, rules, regulations, or laws that
might impinge their intellectual endeavors, there is often disagreement
between scientists and government officials as to what truly is in the "best
interests" of the public's welfare. This disagreement came to a head during
the recent controversy over the publication of two United States ("U.S.")
government-funded research studies on the H5N 1 avian influenza virus.'
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1. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity ("NSABB") faced this issue
when the journals Science and Nature approached the Board seeking an opinion on whether
to publish articles in which two separate scientific groups adapted the highly pathogenic
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While similar conflicts between science and government have been
documented and studied, there has been little discussion on how to better
align the interests of science, government, and the public's welfare
regarding the conduct of important research with inherent safety risks.
Furthermore, the concerns of the general lay public and especially those
living and working in the communities surrounding the sites where high-
risk, cutting-edge research may be taking place often are drowned out
during these conflicts. Better communication and collaboration between
these stakeholders should allow scientists, government officials, and the lay
public to voice their varied concerns. After understanding those concerns,
all parties are able to begin addressing them in a mutually satisfactory
manner, especially if such multi-stakeholder interfacing takes place as part
of public planning, decision-making, and policy-making activities.
Fortunately, models exist for the development of mechanisms to better align
the interest of scientists conducting potentially dangerous biomedical
research and the public's welfare. Through development of such
frameworks, the relationship between scientists, government officials, and
the lay public at the federal, state, and especially local and community
levels of society can be dramatically enhanced. These models can be
strengthened if supported by public policy and legal structures.
This article discusses various issues that should entice members of the
lay public to actively engage and interface with scientific research
institutions and government officials in their communities, and how such
multi-stakeholder interfacing can be promoted as a matter of law and public
policy. Following this Introduction, some background information on the
purpose of scientific research and its impact on public welfare is provided
in Part II, with a particular focus on biomedical research. In Part III, some
key challenges in managing research programs are discussed, with
particular emphasis on intentional and accidental releases of dangerous
H5N1 avian influenza virus to become permissible in ferrets, the closest laboratory model
for human infection. Due in large part to a series of miscommunications, the NSABB
initially recommended that the papers should be redacted to prevent potential irresponsible
or nefarious actors from being able to replicate the research. However, as more information
about the findings themselves became apparent, the NSABB reversed its position and the
articles were published in full. Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 Research,
Nat'l Insts. of Health (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.ih.gov/news/
health/dec2011/od-20.htm; Meeting of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
to Review Revised Manuscripts on Transmissibility of A/H5N1 Influenza Virus, Nat'l Sci.
Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity (Mar. 29- 30, 2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
biosecurity/PDF/NSABBStatementMarch 2012 Meeting.pdf; Statement by NIH Director
Francis Collins, M.D., Ph.D. on the NSABB Review of Revised H5N1 Manuscripts, Nat'l
Insts. of Health (Apr. 20, 2012), available at www.nih.gov/about/
director/04202012 NSABB.htm.
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biological agents into communities. Part IV discusses some existing legal
and policy tools in the United States that are intended to protect the public
from the research-related dangers described in Part III. In Part V, various
aspects about the benefits of public participation in public affairs are
discussed, as are examples of how public participation has been included in
state and local efforts to enhance communication between scientists,
government officials, and members of the lay public regarding issues
related to dangerous biomedical research occurring in their common
community. Part VI and the concluding remarks in Part VII attempt to
synthesize the issues discussed in the preceding parts to support the
argument that enhanced communication and collaboration between
scientists, government officials, and the lay public provides the best way to
ensure that scientific research on dangerous biological agents intended to
promote and protect public welfare is conducted in a way that also
promotes and protects public welfare.
II. BACKGROUND: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND PUBLIC WELFARE
The ultimate goal of biomedical research is to improve the quality of life
for members of society. Modem science has greatly advanced humanity's
understanding of various biological functions and processes, thereby vastly
enhancing its ability to provide better treatments for diseases and tools for
improving human well-being. Seminal biomedical discoveries such as the
use of penicillin as a potent antibiotic have led to significant reductions in
morbidity and mortality and general improvements in overall quality of life
in populations around the world.
Despite these remarkable achievements, many challenges remain in
humanity's ability to prevent and cure a wide range of debilitating diseases,
including a number of highly pathogenic and contagious infectious diseases
that disproportionately affect adolescents and young adults. Infectious
diseases also impose staggering burdens on societies worldwide in terms of
morbidity and mortality rates and loss in productivity.2 These burdens are
exacerbated by socio-economic inequalities within societies and between
nations: while many industrial nations have invested heavily in preventative
medicine, developing countries have nowhere near the resources or capacity
to match the serious impact that infectious diseases have on their respective
2. Ib Christian Bygbjerg, Double Burden of Noncommunicable and Infectious Diseases
in Developing Countries, 337 Sci. 1499 (2012). It is estimated that African nations suffering
from high rates of malaria have a 35% lower Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") compared to
countries that are free from malaria. ROBERT CARLSON, BIOLOGY IS TECHNOLOGY 99 (2010).
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societies.3 Furthermore, the ability to travel anywhere in the world within
24 hours has greatly increased biosecurity threats at the international stage,
as was evident when a local outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome ("SARS") in Hong Kong quickly turned into a global pandemic
in 2003.' The integration of the modem world economy means that the
negative impacts of infectious diseases in one part of the world can have
negative impacts on other parts within a short period of time.
These facts make a strong case for multi-national investment in research
and other efforts to develop novel treatments for infectious diseases
affecting people and societies around the world. The scope of such
investment, however, depends in part on how individual societies and the
international community determine the value and limitations of scientific
research based on its comparative risks and benefits. This issue was at the
center of the recent controversy that arose when scientists researching the
highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza learned how to make the virus
transmissible through the air.
It is estimated that the human fatality rate among those infected with
H5N1 is around 60%,6 which significantly exceeds the rate of mortality
3. Bygbjerg, supra note 2, at 1500. It is important to note that the economic burden of
infectious diseases is neither constrained to developing countries, nor limited to neglected
infectious diseases. Detrimental effects in lost productivity and wages also are evident in the
United States with regard to the economic burden of influenza. In the United States,
influenza epidemics result in roughly 610,660 life-years lost, 3.1 million hospitalization
days, and 31.4 million outpatient visits during an average flu season. The direct medical
costs average $10.4 billion annually, and the total economic burden amounts to
approximately $87.1 billion annually. Noelle-Angelique M. Molinari et al., The Annual
Impact of Seasonal Influenza in the US: Measuring Disease Burden and Costs, 25 VACCINE
5086 (2007).
4. Abu S.M. Abdullah et al., Lessons from the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Outbreak in Hong Kong, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1042 (2003), available at
wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/9/9/pdfs/03-0366.pdf. A pandemic may be defined as the global
spread of an infectious disease that (1) spreads beyond a geographically limited area (e.g., a
continent) and (2) has a higher rate of infected persons than a seasonal epidemic might have.
This does not automatically imply that a pandemic is lethal compared to a localized
epidemic. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [hereinafter WHO], PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 27 (2009), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2009/9789241547680_eng.pdf; see also WHO, WHO Pandemic Phase
Descriptions and Main Actions by Phase, available at http://www.who.int/
influenza/resources/documents/pandemicphasedescriptions and actions.pdf.
5. Sander Herfst et al., Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between
Ferrets, 336 SCI. 1534 (2012); see also Masaki Imai et al., Experimental Adaptation of an
Influenza H5 HA Confers Respiratory Droplet Transmission to a Reassortant H5 HAH1N1
Virus in Ferrets, 486 NATURE 420 (2012).
6. Michael T. Osterholm & Nicholas S. Kelley, Mammalian-Transmissible H5N1
Influenza: Facts and Perspective, 3(2) MBio e00045-12 (2012), available at http://mbio.
asm.org/content/3/2/e00045-12.full.pdf.
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measured during the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic that reportedly
killed one-third of the world's population at that time.7 To date, no
effective treatments or vaccines have been developed that would reduce
mortality and morbidity rates during a H5N1 pandemic.8 Consequently,
any research on H5N1 that describes its adaptability to infect humans
through forms other than direct contact (e.g., aerosol) raises significant
concerns that the findings from such research could be adapted for
malevolent applications intended to harm populations and societies (viz., a
bioterrorism attack).9 Furthermore, such research brings an inherent risk of
an accidental release of the biological agent being studied into the
surrounding population and community."o
Such Dual-Use Research of Concern ("DURC") has come to the
forefront of all debates regarding the importance of conducting cutting-edge
research on highly pathogenic and deadly disease agents (i.e., "dangerous
research") in recent years." The central question in this debate is whether
society is better off not studying certain diseases because the risk that such
research will be used for sinister purposes outweighs the benefits it may
have on responses to future pandemics.12
7. Terrence M. Tumpey et al., Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish
Influenza Pandemic Virus, 310 Sci. 77 (2005).
8. For definition of "pandemic," see supra note 4.
9. Special Issue: H5N1, 336(6088) Sci. 1473 (2012), available at
www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6088.toc#Speciallssue.
10. Joel 0. Wertheim, The Re-Emergence of H1N1 Influenza Virus in 1977: A
Cautionary Tale for Estimating Divergence Times Using Biologically Unrealistic Sampling
Dates, 5(6) PLoS ONE e11184 (2010), available at www.plosone.org/article/info%/3Adoi%/
2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0011184. See also infra III(B).
11. See infra Part III.
12. The U.S. government considers biological-based threats to public welfare a public
policy priority. A variety of activities support public health emergency management efforts
at the federal, state, and local levels. These include statutorily-authorized initiatives to
support research efforts aimed at developing medical countermeasures to dangerous
pathogens and biological agents, as well as efforts to develop various preparedness,
response, recovery, and mitigation capabilities for bioterrorist incidents or natural events
involving such pathogens or biological agents. See, e.g., Project BioShield Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004); Office of Public Health, Emergency
Preparedness Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 71 Fed.
Reg. 38,403, (July 6, 2006); 2012 HHS PHEMCE Strategy and Implementation Plan, U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Pages/
strategy.aspx (last updated Dec. 10, 2012); Public Health Emergency Medical
Countermeasures Enterprise, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.phe.gov/
Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 10, 2012); Public Health
Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local Planning, U.S. CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/capabilities/
DSLR capabilitiesJuly.pdf.
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III. THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING RESEARCH PROGRAMS
A Dual-Use Research and Bioterrorism Concerns
In recent years, several non-state organizations have expressed their
intent to harness cutting-edge technology to generate weapons of mass
destruction to maximize physical and social harm and disruption in civilian
populations. In some cases, such organizations actually have deployed
biological agents against civilian populations. For example, in 1984, the
Rajneesh Cult engaged in a mass salmonella poisoning campaign in an
attempt to manipulate the outcome of local elections in Oregon.13 Between
1993 and 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo Sect in Japan attempted to release
botulinim toxin and anthrax in Tokyo.14 More recently, Al-Qaeda publicly
called for Weapons of Mass Destruction experts to join its cause by
developing and testing biological weapons. 5  Given this recent history,
DURC has emerged as a legitimate concern for governments and the
general public.
In response to these concerns, the research and peer-reviewed journal
communities have grappled with whether to make findings from DURC
publicly available on several occasions, based on a balancing of the benefits
and risks. In the past decade alone, publications have controversially
reported on how mousepox can be made more virulent with the addition of
a single gene (2001);"6 how the polio virus can be created through chemical
synthesis (2002);" and the genetic sequence of the virus underlying the
1918 Spanish influenza (2005).
With scientific publications easily accessible worldwide through the
Internet,19 a compelling argument can be made that published findings from
13. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, America's First Bioterrorism Attack, TIE, Sept. 30, 2001,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,176937,00.html.
14. Archive: Nerve Gas Attack Shocks Tokyo (BBC News broadcast Mar. 1995),
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18455007 (successfully releasing sarin
gas in the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995).
15. Associated Press, Pentagon: Al-Qaeda Pursuing Bio Weapons, USA TODAY, May
23, 2003, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-05-23-us-
wmd x.htm.
16. Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant
Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic
Resistance to Mousepox, 75 J. VIROLOGY 1205 (2001).
17. Jeronimo Cello et al., Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA- Generation of
Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template, 297 Sci. 1016 (2002).
18. Tumpey et al., supra note 7.
19. U.S. National Library of Medicine & National Institutes of Health, PUBMED
CENTRAL.COM, http://www.ncbi.lm.nih.gov/pmc/ (last updated Nov. 14, 2011) (many
scientific articles, in addition to subscription-based online publications, are available online
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DURC will enable malefactors to use the information to create biological
weapons. On the other hand, making information publicly available might
spur the international community to develop more quickly the next
generation of vaccines and pharmaceutical countermeasures, which will
enable governments to prevent and respond effectively to man-made and
natural bioterrorism attacks. As was evident from the recent H5N 1 research
controversy, this choice continues to weigh heavily on many minds as
discussions persist on how much information about DURC findings should
be divulged and disseminated to the public. 20
B. When the Bug Escapes the Lab:
Accidental Releases of Biological Agents
The controversy over H5N1 research and DURC in general has almost
exclusively focused on the danger of malefactors misusing the research for
malevolent purposes. Attracting far less attention from the media are
concerns related to accidental releases of deadly pathogens into the public
from facilities researching such pathogens. These concerns are warranted,
as there have been many instances when highly pathogenic agents
(including influenza, 21 smallpox, 22 and plague23 ) have been accidentally
released from what were perceived as secure research facilities. In their
fight for survival, pathogens have evolved to acquire the most effective
mechanisms for transmission from one host to another. Therefore,
unintentional introductions of a deadly pathogen into a community are a
reality that threatens public health and safety. Because such an event most
likely will be first discovered by community doctors treating patients who
present initially with generic "flu-like" symptoms and then quickly develop
more serious symptoms, mechanisms should be in place to educate and
prepare communities where research on dangerous biological agents occurs
for the possibility of an accidental release.
and free to the public through open access portals such as PubMed Central' (PMC)).
20. Bruce Alberts, Introduction: H5N1, 336(6088) Sci. 1521 (2012), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/336/6088/1521.full.pdf; see generally Special Issue:
H5N1, supra note 9, at 1473.
21. Steve Connor, Did Leak From a Laboratory Cause Swine Flue Pandemic?, THE
INDEPENDENT, June 30, 2009, available at www.independent.co.uk/news/science/did-leak-
from-a-laboratory-cause-swine-flu-pandemic-1724448.html.
22. Robin McKie & Gabriel Stargardter, Smallpox Virus: Crunch Time for the Fate of a
Global Killer, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 12, 2011, available at www.guardian.co.uk/
society/2 0 11/feb/13/smallpox-virus-vector-health-terror.
23. Julie Steenhuysen, Plague Researcher in Chicago Dies from Infection, REUTERS
(Sept. 21, 2009, 1:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/21/us-plague-death-
idUSTRE58K3J120090921.
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DURC is fraught with both risks and opportunities. While research to
enhance understanding of the deleterious effects of dangerous pathogens
certainly falls within the public interest, ensuring that such research is
conducted within the confines of sound scientific judgment and adequate
security protects both the researchers and public at large. Due to the highly
competitive nature of cutting-edge research, it is difficult to expect private
or academic laboratories to be capable of policing themselves in this effort
to maintain safety. Consequently, a clear (if limited) role for external
governance of the safety requirements can surely be advantageous in certain
defined circumstances. As discussed in Part IV, governmental authorities
frequently provide such external governance by enacting laws and adopting
public policies to protect the public from certain types of dangerous
biomedical research.
IV. THE TOOLBOX OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: CURRENT LAWS AND
POLICIES TO KEEP THE PUBLIC SAFE FROM
DANGEROUS BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
As the authors have asserted elsewhere, governments have a "legitimate
interest [to] fulfill . . . their fundamental responsibility to protect their
citizens that justifies taking reasonable actions to regulate activities ...
pos[ing] a significant threat to the general welfare of the public[.]" 24
Furthermore, governments "arguably have a compelling interest that
justifies taking necessary actions to regulate such activities[.]" 25 Scientific
experiments and research on dangerous biological agents are clear examples
of such activities, given the potential threats to populations and
communities posed by the misuse or accidents related to such research.26
Consequently, governments at the federal, state, and local levels in the
United States have taken various steps to address biological-based threats to
the general public welfare as a matter of law and public policy. 27
The most comprehensive legal and policy efforts to keep the public safe
from dangerous biomedical research have occurred at the federal level.28
24. Patrick P. Rose et al., Creating Monsters for the Greater Good of Humanity:
Conflicting Interests of Science and Homeland Security, J. EMERGENCY MGMT., Mar.-Apr.
2012 at 83, 87, available at www.mdchhs.com/articles-resources/articles/creating-monsters-
greater-good-humanity-conflicting-interests-science-an; see infra Part V(A) and text
accompanying notes 41-45 for an elaboration of arguments supporting this assertion.
25. Rose et al., supra note 24.
26. See Part 111, supra.
27. Rose et al., supra note 24, at 87.
28. This makes sense, given the nationwide scope of the threat posed by DURC and
given that the U.S. govermnent (through the National Institutes of Health and other federal
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Perhaps the most prominent of these federal efforts is the National Select
Agent Program administered by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention ("CDC") of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). 29  This program is the
creation of numerous federal statutes30 and regulations3' governing various
aspects of research on dangerous biological agents, including the
possession, use, and transfer of the agents under the study, the entities and
individuals conducting such research, and the types of experiments that can
be performed.3 2 A number of states and local governments have enacted
similar statutes and regulations.3 3 Furthermore, a body of federal statutory
agencies) is the largest funder of biomedical research in the world. About NIH, NAT'L INSTS.
OF HEALTH, http://nih.gov/about/ (last reviewed Aug. 7, 2012).
29. NAT'L SELECT AGENT REGISTRY, http://www.selectagents.gov (last updated Jan. 14,
2013); CDC Select Agent Program, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
www.cdc.gov/phpr/documents/DSAT-brochureJuly2011.pdf (July 2011). This program,
which came into being in response to the April 1995 federal building bombing in Oklahoma
City, was expanded after the Fall 2001 anthrax mailings. Id. at 2; see also About Us, NAT'L
SELECT AGENT REGISTRY, http://www.selectagents.gov/AboutUS.htmil (last updated Jan. 8,
2013).
30. Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat.
647; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
817, 115 Stat. 272, 385-86 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 175b (2009)); Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 511, 110 Stat. 1214, 1284-
85, amended by Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, §201, 116 Stat. 594, 637-46.
31. 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 (2012) (implementing the provisions of the Agricultural
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 relating to the possession, use, and transfer of select
agents and toxins that "have the potential to pose a severe threat to plant health or plant
products."); 9 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2012) (implementing the provisions of the Agricultural
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 relating to the possession, use, and transfer of select
agents and toxins that "have the potential to pose a severe threat to ... animal health, or to
animal products."); 42 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2012) (implementing the provisions of the Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 relating to the
possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins that "have the potential to pose a
severe threat to public health and safety . . .").
32. For a review of these legal authorities, see Michael Greenberger et al., Governance
and Biosecurity: Strengthening Security and Oversight of the Nation's Biological Agent
Laboratories, 13 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 77 (2010); and Kavita Marfatia Berger, The
Role of Science in Preparedness and Response, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 622, 628-32 (2009).
33. See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §17- 601 to -605 (West 2012)
(establishing the Maryland Biological Agents Registry Program); MD. CODE REGS. 10.10.11
(2012) (governing the Maryland Biological Agents Registry Program); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-31a (West 2013) (establishing certain reporting requirements for institutions of
higher education that operate Biosafety Level 3 laboratories in Connecticut); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 3220-3223 (McKinney 2010) (regulating recombinant DNA experiments
conducted in the State of New York); TENN. CoMp. R. & REGS. § 1200-06-03-.11(1)(c)&(d)
Vol 22, 2013 Annals of Health Law 255
ENHANCING COMMUNICATION
and case law has been developed relating to restrictions on the publication
and dissemination of findings from scientific research with implications for
national security and public health and safety.34
(2012) (requiring laboratories in Tennessee handling "cultures and stocks of infectious
agents" to "develop, maintain, and implement policies and procedures" for handling
infectious and hazardous waste); SEATTLE FIRE CODE §2701.1 and .7 (2009) (requiring the
reporting of the locations of Biosafety Level 3 and 4 operations in Seattle to City fire
officials); Bos., MASS., MUN. CODE § 17-9 (2013) (establishing guidelines for the regulation
of the use of recombinant DNA in the City of Boston); Bos., MASS., PUBLIC HEALTH
COMM'N REG., BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY REGULATIONS (2006), available at
www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/regulations/Forms%/ 20%/20Documents/regs LabRegFinal_9-
19-06[1].pdf (establishing permit requirements for Biosafety Level 3 or Level 4 biological
research laboratory operating within the City of Boston); CAMBRIDGE, MASS., BIOSAFETY
REGULATION (2009), available at http://cambridgepublichealth.org/Canibridge Biosafety
Regulation 2009.pdf (establishing local regulation on the use of all biological agents and
local prohibition on the use of biological agents requiring Biosafety Level-4 containment;
CAMBRIDGE, MASS., MUN. CODE ch. 8.20 (2013), available at http://canibridgepublic
health.org/services/regulatory-activities/biosafety/rDNA-ordinance.pdf (establishing local
regulation on the use of recombinant DNA technology); AMHERST, MASS., BOARD OF
HEALTH, RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY AND INFECTIOUS BIOLOGICAL AGENTS (2008),
available at http://ma-amherst3.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2330 (local
regulations on research involving the use of recombinant DNA or infectious biological
agents or toxins, including a local prohibition on the use of recombinant DNA requiring
Biosafety Level-4 containment measures); BELMONT, MASS., BOARD OF HEALTH,
REGULATION FOR THE USE OF RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULE TECHNOLOGY AND NON-
RECOMBINANT INFECTIOUS AGENTS (2001), available at http://www.belmont-
ma.gov/public documents/belmontma health/Regulations0% 20and%/ 2OFees/SO188B2FF.0/B
ioTech%/o20Regs.pdf (establishing local regulations for the use of recombinant DNA
molecule technology and non-recombinant infectious agents, including a local prohibition on
the use of recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, and infectious agents requiring Biosafety
Level-3 or -4 containment measures), accord BEDFORD, MASS. BOARD OF HEALTH (2003)
available at http://www.town.bedford.ma.us/index.php/regulations-a-policies/doc view/711-
bedford-regulations and TEWKSBURY, MASS. BOARD OF HEALTH ch. 8 (2011), available at
http://www.tewksbury.net/Pages/TewksburyMA Health/regs/Chapter/o208%20for%20the%
20use%20fo2ORecombinanto2OrDNAo2OTechnology.pdf. Biosafety Level (BSL) 3 and
4 are the most dangerous pathogens. See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, BIOSAFETY IN MICROBIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 38-59, HHS
PUBLICATION No. (CDC) 21-1112 (5th ed. 2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
biosafety/publications/bmbl5/BMBL.pdf; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH-
CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES: NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED, GAO-09-
574 (Sept. 2009), available at www.gao.gov/assets/300/295543.pdf; U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH-CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES: ASSESSMENT OF THE
NATION'S NEED IS MISSING, GAO-13-466R (Feb. 2013), available at www.gao.gov/
assets/660/652308.pdf.
34. For a review of this area of law, see, e.g., John D. Kraemer & Lawrence 0. Gostin,
The Limits of Government Regulation of Science, 335 SCI. 1047 (2012); Steve Keane, Note,
The Case Against Blanket First Amendment Protection of Scientific Research: Articulating a
More Limited Scope of Protection, 59 STAN. L. REV. 505 (2006); Brian J. Gorman,
Biosecurity and Secrecy Policy: Problems, Theory, and a Call for Executive Action, 2 I/S: J.
L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 53 (2006); Brian J. Gorman, Balancing National Security and
Open Science: A Proposal for Due Process Vetting, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 491 (2005).
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The U.S. government also has made addressing DURC a national public
policy priority, going as far as to issue the official United States
Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of
Concern in the aftermath of the recent controversy over the H5N1 studies.3 5
Furthermore, the Secretary of HHS has renewed the charter for the National
Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity ("NSABB") until April 2014.36 In
its renewed charter, the NSABB is charged with continuing to "provide
advice on and recommend specific strategies for the efficient and effective
oversight of federally conducted or supported dual use biological research,
taking into consideration both national security concerns and the needs of
the research community to foster continued rapid progress in public health
and agricultural research."3 7
Despite the existing legal and policy tools to address the hazards posed
by potentially dangerous biomedical research, they generally reflect a "top-
down" prescriptive approach from federal officials that favor engagement
and participation from the scientific community but limit and even
discourage engagement or participation from the lay public. As of January
2013, the 25 voting members of the NSABB included representatives from
academia, the private and non-profit sectors, and retired military generals,
but no representatives from the lay public.38 Furthermore, although the
U.S. government has solicited comments from the public on certain federal
actions to regulate DURC and other research activities involving dangerous
35. U.S. GOV'T, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES
DuAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN (Mar. 29, 2012), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/PDF/United States Government Policyfor Oversigh
t-ofDURC FINAL version_032812.pdf. For reaction and discussion of this policy from
the scientific research community, see Carrie D. Wolinetz, Implementing the New U.S. Dual-
Use Policy, 336 SCI. 1525 (2012).
36. Sec'y Health & Human Servs., Charter, National Science Advisory Board on
Biosecurity [NSABB Charter] (April 2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/
biosecurity/PDF/NSABB-Charter Signed 2012.pdf. All federal advisory committees such
as the NSABB terminate after two years unless renewed by the appropriate U.S. government
official (for advisory commiittees created by a U.S. government official) or as otherwise
specified by Congress (for advisory committees created by an Act of Congress). 5 U.S.C.
App. 2, § 14.
37. NSABB Charter, supra note 36, at 1. Documentation of the NSABB's numerous
activities and public meetings, as well as a library of previous NSABB publications, is
available online. See NSABB Documents, NIH, http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/
biosecuritydocuments.html.
38. NSABB Member Roster, NIH, http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity
voting members.html. Fifteen federal agencies and departments also are represented on the
NSABB through non-voting ex officio members. The NSABB Charter includes "public
perspective" as an area of expertise that may be represented on the NSABB; the charter
language, however, makes it clear that this is not a requirement for the composition of the
NSABB membership roster. NSABB Charter, supra note 36, at 3-4.
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biological agents,39 these solicitations arguably have undermined public
participation and interest in several ways. First, the NSABB tends to focus
on questions or issues of a technical or abstract nature that are of greater
import to the scientific community and research interests than to the lay
public and the communities where such research occurs. In addition, public
engagement is often limited by the details of the process. For example,
public meetings may be limited to a specified physical location (e.g., a hotel
in Bethesda, Maryland) during typical business hours, and communications
(e.g., electronic or written correspondence) with decision-makers may be
made through unofficial channels not open to public scrutiny. While this
form of limited public engagement and participation may suffice for federal
rule-making and policy-making on certain issues for the nation as a whole,
a more direct form of public participation is required when addressing
biological-based threats to the public as a matter of law and public policy at
the state and local levels, where planning and policy decisions have a more
direct and immediate impact on members of the lay public and the
communities in which they live.
This "more direct" public participation should allow for greater
engagement between scientists, government officials, and the lay public.
As discussed in Part V, public participation of this nature in planning,
decision-making, and policy-making has many benefits for the public's
welfare.40
39. Public Consultation on Personnel Reliability and Culture of Responsibility Issues, 75
Fed. Reg. 76,997 (Dec. 10, 2010); Influenza Viruses Containing the Hemagglutinin from the
Goose/Guangdong/1/96 Lineage, 77 Fed. Reg. 63,783 (Oct. 17, 2012) (request for
information and comment).
40. Furthermore, federal decision-makers in the emergency management and public
health emergency preparedness communities appear to agree with this approach and have
urged state and especially local governments to include subject matter experts and
community partners from the public, private, non-profit, and faith-based sectors in their
emergency management activities. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, COMPREHENSIVE
PREPAREDNESS GUIDE 201: THREAT AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
GUIDE 9-10 (2012), available at www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=5823 ("As the
impacts of a threat or hazard affect more than the public sector, the jurisdiction should work
with their whole community partners, including the private and nonprofit sectors and faith-
based organizations, to gain a full understanding of all of the impacts to the community.");
Public Health Preparedness Capabilities, supra note 12, at 16-26 ("Community
Preparedness" and "Community Recovery").
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V. ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN SCIENTISTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE
COMMUNITY TO ADVANCE PUBLIC WELFARE
A Government and Communities
The relationship between governments and the people over which they
assert their authority is a fundamental question of political philosophy. In
democratic societies, governments derive their legitimacy from the
consenting public that they govern. This concept is enshrined in the
preamble to the Constitution of the United States, which clearly states that it
is "We the People of the United States" who "ordain and establish" this
foundational source of the U.S. government's authority, and that this
consent of the people is given in part to "insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defense, [and] promote the general Welfare."4
Public safety, public security, and public health arguably relate to domestic
tranquility, the common defense, and general welfare;4 2 thus, the references
to these concepts in the Constitution provide "the theoretical and legal
authority for federally funded initiatives aimed at protecting and preserving
the public's safety, security, and health throughout the United States."43
41. U.S. CONST. pIbl.
42. Rose et al., supra note 24, at 86.
43. Id. The Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States [.]" U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1. In their dissenting opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (addressing the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health
Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010))), four
Associate Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court recently summarized the history of the Court's
interpretation of "public Welfare" as used in the Spending Clause:
No one has ever doubted that the Constitution authorizes the Federal Government
to spend money, but for many years the scope of this power was unsettled. The
Constitution grants Congress the power to collect taxes "to ... provide for the ...
general Welfare of the United States," ... and from "the foundation of the Nation
sharp differences of opinion have persisted as to the true interpretation of the
phrase" "the general welfare." [James] Madison, it has been said, thought that the
phrase "amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers enumerated in
the subsequent clauses of the same section," while [Alexander] Hamilton
"maintained the clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later
enumerated [and] is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them."
The Court resolved this dispute ... [in United States v. Butler in favor of]
Hamilton's approach and found that "the power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." Instead ... the spending
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In addition to the federal government's constitutional role in providing
for the common defense and promoting general public welfare nationwide,
the individual states also exercise an inherent "police power" to pursue
activities aimed at protecting and preserving public safety, security, and
health within their jurisdictional boundaries, both state-wide and locally.
As the authors have discussed elsewhere, emergency management and
homeland security efforts at the federal, state, and local levels are among
the aforementioned activities relating to public safety and security. 5
While governments have their responsibilities to protect and preserve
general public welfare, the governed have civic responsibilities of their
own, including an essential role in public affairs. As one commentator has
noted:
Public participation is an ideal of democratic theory. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, a preeminent theorist of democracy and participation,
envisioned a society wherein citizens would make the decisions that
affect them. Rousseau believed that participation assures a government
that is responsible to its citizens. Participation in government also
educates people and develops citizens who are individually and socially
responsible-those who know the difference between their individual
preferences and the public interest. Through involvement in the
decision[-]making that affects their lives, individual citizens become
more free because they gain control over their lives.46
Ideally, public participation may be defined as "the means by which the
views of all parties interested in a given issue are integrated into the
decision[-]making process[J" with the "ultimate objective [of] mak[ing]
and implement[ing] better decisions than would result in its absence."4
power's "confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of
[Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution] which bestow and define the
legislative powers of the Congress."
132 S.Ct. 2566, 2657-58 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, J.J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936)).
44. Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of the State
(Supp 1), 120 PUB. HEALTH REP. 20 (2005); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law in a
New Century, Part I: Law as a Tool to Advance the Community's Health, 283 JAMA 2837,
2841 (2000).
45. Rose et al., supra note 24, at 87.
46. Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process, 18 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 173, 178 & nn. 37-41 (1991) (notes omitted) (citing Rousseau's seminal 1762 treatise,
Du Contrat social ou Principes du droit politique (The Social Contract, or Principles of
Political Right), construed in CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
22-24 (1970)); and JOHN STUART MILL, ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND CULTURE 186 (1962)).
47. Mimi L. Becker, The International Joint Commission and Public Participation: Past
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Professor Mimi Larsen Becker has succinctly summarized the benefits of
public participation in public decision-making processes as follows:
Decisions made with input from interested parties are more likely to
result in an adequate specification of problems, an assessment of
alternative solutions, and the integration of cultural and social values than
would otherwise occur. Public participation can also provide an effective
means for oversight of progress and provide for better government
accountability during policy implementation. But the main objectives of
public participation are: (1) to build public consensus regarding the
nature of problems and the preferred solutions, and (2) to provide the
basis for the sustained political will . . . to implement actions necessary to
achieve joint objectives.48
Furthermore, Becker argues that:
[p]ublic participation ought to involve two-way communication between
the decision[-]maker and the public ... [and] should be viewed as an
integral part of a public policy process to be incorporated in the
decision[-]making process from the earliest stages of policy initiation
(problem definition) through the assessment, selection, implementation,
and evaluation stages of a proposal or program.49
Public participation in the planning and policy-making process has in
fact had a long history in the United States that pre-dates the nation itself,
particularly in the area of social policy at the local or community level. 0 In
more recent years, this democratic ideal and American tradition has been
codified into federal, state, and local legal authorities providing for public
hearings and workshops, citizen panels and advisory councils, public notice
and comment procedures, and citizen lawsuits in policy areas such as
environmental protection," natural resources management (e.g., land and
Experiences, Present Challenges, Future Tasks, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 235, 237 (1993).
48. Id.at238.
49. Becker, supra note 47, at 239 n.Il (citation omitted) (citing GARRY D. BREWER &
PETER DELEON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY ANALYSIS 17-21 (1983)).
50. See, e.g., Mark Schlesinger, Paradigms Lost: The Persisting Search for Community
in U.S. Health Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 937, 938, 943-55 (1997) (noting that
"[i]n every era of [U.S. history], policy makers have searched for the appropriate role for
local communities in addressing social problems[]"; and reviewing how "prevailing notions
of community as applied to health policy have changed" from colonial times through 1995);
and Folk, supra note 46, at 179 & n.42 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 62-68 (J. Mayer ed. 1969, Bowen trans. 1862) (emphasizing that participation is a
"tradition of democracy" that historically was "reflected in the New England town meetings
described by Alexis de Tocqueville over 150 years ago")).
51. See, e.g., Folk, supra note 46, at 179 n.42-46 (identifying provisions for public
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water),52 community planning,53 and food and drug safety." Furthermore,
the Community-Based Public Health ("CBPH") model for disease
prevention and health promotion has emerged in recent years, whereby
partnerships between public health professionals and community-based
organizations ("CBOs") are formed to allow "the community whose health
is the focus of the intervention [to] identifly] and assume ... ownership of
the health problem by actively working together with health professionals
throughout the various project phases."
Several important limitations and criticisms of public participation in
public affairs and the policy-making process have been identified in the
literature. The democratic philosophies underlying effective public
participation assume that the public participants will engage in an informed,
educated, and rational public discourse, 6 consequently "favor[ing] those
who both can and wish to articulate their concerns through reasoned
analysis, skewing the conversation to be more suited to some members of
the polity than others."" Some critics have noted that the public often does
not engage in reasoned analysis, and that public participation in government
policy-making can have unintended consequences that are detrimental to
participation in various federal environmental statutes and discussing opportunities for
public participation provided for in the Superfund cleanup process).
52. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 47 (considering the adequacy of the International Joint
Comnmission's public participation initiatives in implementing the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the United States and
Canada); Robert D. Comer, Cooperative Conservation: The Federalism Underpinnings to
Public Involvement in the Management of Public Lands, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1133 (2004)
(examining "the constitutional authority for cooperative conservation, or the sharing of
federal authority with nonfederal entities in the management of public lands").
53. See, e.g., Amy Widman, Replacing Politics with Democracy: A Proposal for
Community Planning in New York City and Beyond, 11 J. L. & POL'Y 135, 176 (2002)
(examining "whether the comprehensive planning process [in New York City] lives up to its
ideal as a method of public participation").
54. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Advisory Committees: Consumer Representatives,
www.fda.gov/AdvisoryConmiittees/AboutAdvisoryConmittees/ComnitteeMenibership/uc
m231782.htm.
55. Vence L. Bonham et al., Community-Based Dialogue: Engaging Communities of
Color in the United States' Genetics Policy Conversation, 34 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
325, 332-33 (2009).
56. See id. at 331 (citing L. M. FLECK, JusT CARING: THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF
HEALTH CARE RATIONING AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION ch. 5 (Oxford University Press
2008) and J. S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM 37 (Yale University Press 1993)); and Becker, supra note 47, at 239.
57. Bonham et al., supra note 55, at 332 (quoting Iris Marion Young, Communication
and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 120, 123
(S. Benhabib ed., Princeton University Press 1996) ("[T]he norms of deliberation are
culturally specific and often operate as forms of power that silence or devalue the speech of
some people")).
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public welfare. For example, Professor Frank Cross has argued that public
perceptions of societal risks are "centrally tainted by cognitive limitations
and biased or incomplete information,"" and that over-reliance on such
public perceptions in government risk control policy could result in
diversion of finite governmental resources away from "more authentic and
significant" risks, higher private economic costs, and increased risks of
dangerous or fatal errors.59 Cross also argues that a number of justifications
for limiting public participation in public policy-making exist:
1. That members of the public might not want government policy to
closely reflect their risk perceptions;60
2. That members of the public "might recognize the shortcomings
of their own perceptions and choose to defer to scientific
expertise in government policy";6'
3. That the United States (under its current Constitution) is built
upon a representative democracy rather than a direct
democracy; 62 and
4. That public participation does not necessarily further true
majoritarian democracy because "participation often degrades
into a battle of unrepresentative private interest groups" and may
have "a built-in bias which favors the affluent and reduces the
democratic influence of ordinary citizens, especially the
underprivileged. "63
58. Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 968 (1994).
59. Id. at 929-55. In conclusion, Professor Cross remarks:
Few individuals would support such institutionalization of ignorance. Yet when it
comes to matters of risk and regulation, the public ignorance wears a cloak of
value judgment that tries to legitimize its role. However, much of the public
perception is ascribable to simple ignorance, and when value judgments are
involved, they are not always noble ones worthy of govermnent cognizance.
Id. at 968.
60. See id. at 951.
61. Id. at 951-52.
62. Id. at 951 ("We have a representative democracy, in which the people delegate
decision[-]making authority to [elected] representatives. Thus, United States democracy does
not imply the automatic transfer of public predilections into govermnent policy."); and id. at
953 ("It must not be forgotten that, even in the total absence of direct public participation,
govermnent decisions are ultimately made by the elected representatives of the people.").
63. Id. at 954; see also Widman, supra note 53, at 176 (asserting that
[d]emographically homogenous groups may organize more easily and thus have more time
to devote to political lobbying" and that "the community with more effective organization
and leadership could be perceived by city agencies as more likely to take issues to the ballot
box, thus subtly (and perhaps wrongly) convincing political representatives that the goals of
the politically savvy group reflect those of the community as a whole.").
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These justifications resonate with those critics who have warned about the
"deleterious result to administrative goals of efficiency, expertise and
control" that may arise from extensive public participation in public policy-
making.
More recently, however, some commentators have countered these
criticisms of the role of public participation and public perceptions in
policy-making with the argument that "[e]xpressions of assumptions, fears,
hopes, beliefs, and concerns may or may not fit into a strictly reason-based
framework, but may more authentically convey legitimate issues that are
relevant to policy decision[-]making."6 ' Even in arguing against over-
reliance on public perception in policy-making, Cross acknowledges that
"[p]revention of public fear is one legitimate concern of government[,]" and
that "[p]ragmatism compels the avoidance of policies, however
theoretically sensible, when public perception would render those policies
futile and wasteful."66
As discussed in Part V(C), public participation and community
engagement in the governance of certain types of research is challenging
but critical to ensuring that the public's welfare is fully protected. Given
the delicacies in developing such relationships, governmental authorities
acting as an elected surrogate of the public can establish some parameters
that both encourage the necessary public engagement and create certain
baseline security standards to ensure a reasonable level of public health and
safety.
64. Widman, supra note 53, at 142 (citing Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in
Environmental Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheresof Public
Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 263, 273 (1999)).
65. Bonham et al., supra note 55, at 332 n.4 ("While the role of reason should not be
overemphasized in public deliberation, it should not be underemphasized either. Ultimately,
public policies need to be justified and legitimated to all who are affected by those policies.
The work of justification is necessarily the work of reason."); see also Widman, supra note
53, at 141 ("Meaningful public participation focuses on the process, rather than the ultimate
decision.").
66. Cross, supra note 58, at 968; see also id. at 955 (citing Susan Hadden, Public
Perception of Hazardous Waste, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 47, 51 (1991) and Branden B. Johnson,
Public Concerns and the Public Role in Siting Nuclear and Chemical Waste Facilities, 11
ENVTL. MGMT. 571, 582 (1987)) ("However dubious and unsafe it may be to rely upon
public perception, the decision[-]making process cannot exclude public opinion. Even with
restrictions on public participation, the public will continue to influence government
decision[-]makers, making its total exclusion from the risk regulation process impossible.
Efforts to bar the public entirely from risk decision[-] making may produce only
adversariness and litigation.") (citations omitted).
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B. Science and Government
As an institution built on democratic principles, the U.S. government
seeks to engage the public on a broad level by informing the public of how
it actively strives to improve the quality of life for all citizens by promoting
the advancement of scientific discoveries, as outlined in the missions of
HHS and especially NIH. 6' Generally speaking, this advancement occurs
by the U.S. government making available public monies to academic and
private institutions to pursue the identification of novel treatments in the
fight against many different types of diseases. Scientific research is
obviously a very technical field, but in order to represent the public's best
interest, the U.S. government has developed a system where the value of
scientific research conducted is gauged, measured, and evaluated by a peer-
review system.6' The U.S. government also has developed policies for the
public dissemination of research that have successfully moved through the
peer-review system and received federal funding:
The NIH Public Access Policy ensures that the public has access to the
published results of NIH funded research. It requires scientists to submit
final peer-reviewed journal manuscripts that arise from NIH funds to the
digital archive PubMed Central upon acceptance for publication. To help
advance science and improve human health, the Policy requires that these
papers are accessible to the public on PubMed Central no later than 12
months after publication.69
The U.S. government has been less successful at informing the public on
issues related to ongoing research at various institutions and to how
government agencies select promising funding opportunities. In the current
peer-review process, the reviewers take on the responsibility of representing
the public's best interest when deciding which research proposals to fund.
However, these representatives of the public's best interest are highly
skilled scientists with very technical backgrounds and whose perception of
DURC concerns might differ from the average lay citizen. Greater
community engagement and participation thus becomes essential for
creating avenues of communication that lead to a better integration of
scientific institutions within their communities.
67. U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., About HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/about/
index.html; U.S. Nat'l Insts. of Health, About NIH, Mission, http://www.nih.
gov/about/mission.htm.
68. See, e.g., NIH Peer Review Process, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer review
process.htm; NIH Peer Review Policies & Practicies, http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/peer/.
69. U.S. Nat'l Insts. of Health, National Institutes of Health Public Access,
http://publicaccess.nih.gov/.
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C. Science and Communities
1. Public Outreach and Information
The notion of community engagement in research is not new. The first
major effort to codify best practices for scientific researchers to reach out to
their communities began in the United States in October 1995, when the
CDC and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR")
partnered to establish the Committee for Community Engagement.70 The
work of this committee was completed in 1997 with the publication of the
first edition of Principles for Community Engagement.
The Principles for Community Engagement identifies a continuum of
public participation.72 At the lower (more fundamental) end of this
continuum is the concept of outreach, which is intended to improve the
factual understanding of the community in an effort to dispel
misconceptions and fear.73 Outreach and public information sharing
represent the critical foundation upon which all higher involvement models
are built and requires the establishment of appropriate lines of
communication that flow from scientists to community. Without successful
communication, all other community engagement is impossible .7 The
unfortunate reality is that the natural inclination of the general public is to
distrust the motivations and techniques for advanced research, particularly
when it involves inherently dangerous materials, such as select agents.
70. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CLINICAL AND TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCE
AWARDS CONSORTIUM COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT KEY FUNCTION COMMITTEE TASK FORCE
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
xv, NIH Publication No. 11-7782 (2d ed. June 2011), available at www.atsdr.cdc.gov/
communityengagement/pdf/PCE Report 508 FINAL.pdf.
71. U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION/AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES
AND DISEASE REGISTRY (CDC/ATSDR) COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT (1st ed. 1997), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
phppo/pce/. A revised second edition of this document was published in June 2011.
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT (2011), supra note 70.
72. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT (2011), supra note 70, at 8 (Fig 1.1).
73. Id. at 8.
74. Barbara A. Israel et al., Review of Community-Based Research: Assessing
Partnership Approaches to Improve Public Health, 19 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 173 (1998);
Syed M. Ahmed & Ann-Gel S. Palermo, Community Engagement in Research: Frameworks
for Education and Peer Review, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1380 (2010); Vicki Marsh et al.,
Beginning Community Engagement at a Busy Biomedical Research Programme:
Experiences from the KEMRI CGMRC-Wellcome Trust Research Programme, Kilifi, Kenya,
67 SOC. SCI. & MED. 721 (2008).
75. U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., National Select Agent Registry,
http://www.selectagents.gov/. Select agents are "biological agents ... that could pose a
severe threat to public health and plant health, or to animal or plant products." About Us,
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This distrust can be magnified when, because of public safety and security
concerns, scientists and their regulators cannot be as forthright about the
science being conducted, laboratories being utilized, or the types of research
being conducted. 6 Lack of full disclosure makes any communications
complicated and seriously hampers the ability of both researchers and
community members to build appropriate collaborative relationships.
2. Community Consultation and Community-Based Participatory Research
The expansion of community engagement through outreach and
information sharing can establish a framework that allows a two-way
collaboration between the scientists conducting dangerous research and
members of the general public who potentially may be affected by the
research. To expand from a standard outreach program, the next step is to
establish a system or forum for two-way communication. This inherently
allows for community-driven feedback to be taken into the research
program.
The best illustrations of two-way interaction between science and
community occur in the context of Community-Based Participatory
Research ("CBPR"). CBPR is defined as "a collaborative process that
equitably involves all partners in the research process and recognizes the
unique strengths that each brings[J" where the research topic is of
importance to the community and the research aims to combine "knowledge
and action for social change to improve community health and eliminate
health disparities."7" CBPR thus aims to establish a sustainable
commitment between the research community and public to work in tandem
to solve each other's concerns and promote the objectives of both parties.
CBPR frameworks work best for community-based public health
research endeavors. Establishing such a framework in the context of
biodefense or cutting-edge infectious disease research is far more complex.
The ability of the public to participate in the conduct of this research is
extremely limited. Furthermore, federal grant spending for such programs
NAT'L SELECT AGENT REGISTRY, supra note 29.
76. Laura H. Kahn, Biodefense Research: Can Secrecy and Safety Coexist?, 2
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 81 (2004); Andrew H.
Fell & Patricia J. Bailey, Public Response to Infectious Disease Research: The UC Davis
Experience, 46 INST. FOR LABORATORY ANIMAL RES. J. 65 (2005), available at
http://dels-old.nas.edu/ilar nhilarjournal/46_ 1/html/v460 Ifell. shtl; James B. Petro & David
A. Relman, Understanding Threats to Scientific Openness, 302 SCI. 1898 (2003).
77. See supra, note 55 and accompanying text.
78. COMMUNITY HEALTH SCHOLARS PROGRAM, STORIES OF IMPACT (2001), available at
www.kellogghealthscholars.org/about/ctrack impact scholars book.pdf.
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is so restrictive that it does not allow for community engagement to be
practicably considered within the context of the other burdensome
requirements that researchers in such environments face. 79 Despite recent
efforts to improve government oversight of dangerous research that utilizes
federal grant funding,so the unfortunate reality is that little attention has
been paid to the greater need for community engagement and consultation.
Mechanisms to bridge the disconnect between scientists, government, and
the lay public represent a significant yet necessary hurdle to continuing
safe and efficacious discovery, particularly in the area of cutting-edge
research."
D. Scientists, Government Officials, and the Lay Public as Joint Community
Partners: Enhancing the Multi-Stakeholder Interface
The preceding discussions in this Part make it clear that much
misunderstanding and poor communication frequently exists between
scientists, government officials, and the lay public. It is also clear from
these discussions that enhancing the interface between these stakeholders
poses a variety of challenges. In many instances, research is conducted
without the surrounding neighborhoods and community being aware of its
existence. Although this may occur for proprietary reasons (especially
when the research is conducted by industrial and private-sector entities), a
disconnect remains between the scientists conducting such research and the
members of the surrounding community. Furthermore, scientists
conducting research on dangerous biological agents may believe that their
work benefits the greater good of society and thereby advances the public
welfare and interests of their surrounding community, whereas members of
79. Gigi Kwik Gronvall et al., High-Containment Biodefense Research Laboratories:
Meeting Report and Center Recommendations, 5 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM 75 81-82
(2007), available at www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007/2007
articlepdfs/2007-04-04-highcontainentbioresearchlab.pdf,
80. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T, POLICY FOR OVERSIGHT, supra note 35; U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (2009), supra note 33; and U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
(2013), supra note 33.
81. Possible best practices to incorporate when designing such bridging mechanisms
may be derived from recently-published reviews of public deliberation in decisions related to
health research and policy. See e.g., Joanna E. Siegel, Jessica Waddell Heeringa & Kristin L.
Carman, Public Deliberation in Decisions about Health Research, 15 VIRTUAL MENTOR:
AM. MED. Ass'N J. ETHICS 56 (2013), available at http://virtualmentor.ama-
assn.org/2013/01/pdf/pfor2-1301.pdf; and KRISTIN L. CARMAN ET AL., THE USE OF PUBLIC
DELIBERATION IN ELICITING PUBLIC INPUT: FINDINGS FROM A LITERATURE REVIEW, AHRQ
Publication No. 13-EHCO70-EF (Rockville, Md., Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality Feb. 2013), available at www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/ehc/assets/File/
Deliberation-Public-Lit-Review-1 30 2 13 .pdf.
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that community may have difficulty understanding or accepting that the
benefits of such research outweigh the risks.
A delicate approach is needed to enable productive conversations
regarding the safety and security of people in communities in which
research on dangerous biological agents takes place. In the international
arena, active engagement is underway to establish fair policies to meet the
security concerns of the public while providing assurances that scientists
can continue to do their work without major interference from
governmental authorities and members of the surrounding community.
These international efforts are guided by a report on Biotechnology
Research in an Age of Terrorism issued in 2004 by the National Research
Council's Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the
Destructive Application of Biotechnology.8 2 The scope of this report is
much more broadly applicable to enhancing the partnership between
scientists and government agencies to allow research to be conducted in a
safe and secure environment with every freedom intact for scientists.
In the United States, some progress in this area has been made in the area
of emergency preparedness and management with the adoption of a
community-based, all-hazards approach to emergency response planning
and preparedness at the federal, state, and local levels. However, there is
still much room to delineate best practices for enhanced emergency
preparedness that could better serve the interests of the public and science
through enhanced communications, public policy initiatives, and laws,
especially at the local level. This all-inclusive approach must also integrate
threats beyond those perceived as clear and present dangers. Discussions
between scientific institutions and leaders in the surrounding community
need to consider worst-case scenarios that include accidental releases of
biological pathogens.
1. Community-Based Participatory Planning,
Decision-Making, and Policy-Making
As mentioned previously, public participation in public affairs and
public-policy making has come under criticism because the public does not
always engage in reasonable analysis and deliberation.83  Because
reasonable analysis is also fundamental to the philosophy of science and
82. COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN
AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.
php?isbn=0309089778.
83. See supra, Part V(A).
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scientific inquiry, some commentators have concluded that the input of
scientists and subject-matter experts is more valuable for governmental
planning, decision-making, and policy-making efforts than input from the
interested public." These recommendations have been reflected in actual
practice at times:
Government has often used the existence of these different approaches to
the decision[-]making process as a reason for excluding the public. To
the scientist or the economist, the public may be seen as emotional and
irrational merely because it refuses to view situations from the same
perspective. The public may want unreasonable solutions or may refuse
to pay attention to scientific and economic analyses performed to support
a decision. 85
Bringing together scientists, government officials, and members of the
public in the process of planning, decision-making, and policy-making thus
faces its share of challenges. Fortunately, there are precedents for such
collaborations from the fields of public health, such as the application of
CBPR principles to address public health issues,86 and professionals and
scholars in this field have even put together guides on how to apply CBPR
principles and practices to influence the public policy process."
These principles can be applied to decision-making and policy-making
related to research endeavors across a broad swath of disciplines.
Unfortunately, their applicability to cutting-edge biodefense-based research
is not as easily discerned given the necessity of separating the general
public from dangerous organisms and the inherent security risks of
providing complete disclosure of the research. However, just because the
application of principles of CBPR and public participation is more
challenging in this arena does not mean that it is impossible to achieve. The
illustrative examples described in Part V(D)(2) are testament to this.88
84. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 58, at 949-55, 968-69.
85. Folk, supra note 46, at 186.
86. James Krieger et al., Using Community-Based Participatory Research to Address
Social Determinants of Health: Lessons Learned From Seattle Partners for Healthy
Communities, 29(3) HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAVIOR 361 (2002); Israel et al., supra note 74;
Siegel et al., supra note 81; and CARMAN ET AL., supra note 81.
87. Cassandra Ritas, Speaking Truth, Creating Power: A Guide to Policy Work for
Community-Based Participatory Research Practitioners (July 2003), available at
http://depts.washington.edu/ccph/pdf files/ritas.pdf; MEREDITH MINKLER ET AL.,
COMMUNITY-BASED PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH: A STRATEGY FOR BUILDING HEALTHY
COMMUNITIES AND PROMOTING HEALTH THROUGH POLICY CHANGE (2012), available at
http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%/ 7B97C6D565-BB43-406D-A6D5-
ECA3BBF35AFO%7D/CBPR.pdf.
88. For a review of examples of public participation in another controversial area of
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2. Illustrative Examples
a. Examples of Local and State Policy: Maryland
One local-level model for engagement between scientists, government
officials, and the general public in the area of cutting-edge biodefense
research has been initiated in Frederick County, Maryland, home to the
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
("USAMRIID") at Fort Detrick. In March 2010, the National Research
Council issued a report recommending a "more proactive, two-way
communication effort between USAMRIID and the surrounding
community"89 that could "build trust, alleviate concerns about community
safety, and provide an opportunity for community members to participate in
the continuous improvement of laboratory practices."90 i response to this
report, the Containment Lab Community Advisory Committee ("CLCAC")
was established as a joint committee of the City of Frederick and the
Frederick Board of County Commissioners in November 2010 and began
meeting in late January 201191 The committee is composed entirely of
Frederick County residents and has representation from the community, the
City of Frederick, and the Frederick Board of County Commissioners.92
The stated purpose of the CLCAC is to:
[1.] Foster two-way connunication between the public and the
operators of the high containment laboratories operating at Fort
Detrick and elsewhere in Frederick County [
science, see Phil Richardson et al., Public Involvement As A Tool To Enhance Nuclear
Safety, ENERGY STRATEGY REVIEWS (2012) (in press), available at http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211467X12000375.
89. DRAFT CHARTER, NAT'L INTERAGENCY BIODEFENSE CAMPUS, FORT DETRICK CMTY.
ADVISORY COMM., available at http://frederickcountymd.gov/documents/13/989/latest%/ 20
charter/ 020for/ 020NIBC%/ 20CAC.PDF (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
90. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATION OF THE HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS OF THE
NEW USAMRIID HIGH-CONTAINMENT FACILITIES AT FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND 59 (2010).
91. TE CONTAINMENT LABORATORY COMMUNITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF FREDERICK,
MD., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT: JANUARY- SEPTEMBER 2011 3 (Oct. 11, 2011), available at
www.cityoffrederick.com/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1071; News Release, Frederick
County, Md., City of Frederick, Md., U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Detrick, & U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, County, City & Fort Detrick to Form
Containment Laboratory Community Advisory Commiittee (Sept. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.cityoffrederick.com/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1073. The City of Frederick is
the self-governing County Seat of Frederick County, Maryland, Md. Manual On-Line,
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/37mun/frederick/html/f.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2013).
92. TE CONTAINMENT LABORATORY COMMUNITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF FREDERICK,
MD, supra note 91, at 3.
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[2.] Seek information about public concerns and ways to address those
concerns[; and]
[3.] Advise and make recommendations on behalf of the public to
government, containment laboratory[,] and Fort Detrick officials
regarding opportunities to improve any laboratory-related
operational matters that may potentially impact public safety and
health.93
In its first two years of operation, the CLCAC has worked to establish
robust communications between command-level staff at Fort Detrick and
the surrounding community that has facilitated information sharing about
the laboratory safety aspects of the base and the conveyance of questions
and concerns from the public to military leadership at USAMRIID. At each
meeting, new potential interfaces with the public are discussed, new
avenues for rapid receipt and conveyance of public concerns are considered,
and new partners are engaged to enhance awareness of the public health
preparedness infrastructure that might be required to respond to a laboratory
accident at USAMRIID or its surrounding private support laboratories. 9 4
While the CLCAC has been successful in fostering and building a
structure for communications, some challenges have not yet been
addressed. For example, the private laboratories operating in the area
surrounding Fort Detrick are under the oversight of the Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("DHMH"). Citing security
concerns, DHMH has been unable to share with the public or CLCAC the
identities of these laboratories working on select agents in Frederick
County. This has impeded the ability of CLCAC to engage those
laboratories in discussions related to safety and security in an effort to
enhance the public's safety, well-being, and awareness. 95
93. Containment Laboratory Community Advisory Committee Purpose, THE
CONTAINMENT LABORATORY COMMUNITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF FREDERICK, MD.,
http://www.cityoffrederick.com/index.aspx?NID=564. A containment laboratory is one that
"employs engineering controls for managing infectious materials in the laboratory
environment where they are being handled or maintained. The purpose of containment is to
reduce or eliminate exposure to laboratory workers, other persons and the outside
environment to potentially hazardous agents." Office of Research Facilities-Development
and Operations, Policies and Guidelines-Section 1-2: Definitions, U.S Dep't of Health &
Human Sers., http://orf.od.nih.gov/PoliciesAndGuidelines/BiomedicalandAnimalResearch
FacilitiesDesignPoliciesandGuidelines/DRMHTMLver/Chapterl/Pages/Sectionl-
2Definitions.aspx (last updated Nov. 27, 2012).
94. Containment Laboratory Community Advisory Committee Minutes, THE
CONTAINMENT LABORATORY COMMUNITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF FREDERICK, MD,
www.cityoffrederick.com/Archive.aspx?AMID=37.
95. Audio Recording: Containment Laboratory Community Advisory Committee (Nov.
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As a result of its work, the CLCAC issued a set of legislative proposals
in 2012 that aimed to enhance laboratory safety throughout the State of
Maryland.96 These legislative proposals were formally introduced in the
2012 Regular Session of the General Assembly of Maryland as Senate Bill
758, with the sponsorship of three Maryland State Senators (led by one
representing parts of Frederick County).9 7  Senate Bill 758 included
provisions that would have:
1. Established a Containment Laboratory Oversight Division within
DHMH as the "sole unit of [Maryland] State Government
responsible for oversight of containment laboratories in the
State" with the authority to administer the Maryland state
Biological Agents Registry Program and to "establish and
enforce standards for the location, design, maintenance, and
operation of containment laboratories in the State that protect the
health and safety of laboratory workers, the public, and the
environment from potentially harmful biological agents]";98
2. Required the Secretary of DHMH to adopt regulations
establishing various standards and requirements for containment
laboratories in the State and establishing "uniform emergency
notification and response procedures [for State and local
emergency management agencies to] follow during emergencies
involving containment laboratories;99
8, 2011), available at http://www.cityoffrederick.com/Index.aspx?NID=407.
96. Proposed Legislation for Integrating and Streamlining Oversight of BSL-3/4
Laboratories in the State of Maryland, THE CONTAINMENT LABORATORY COMMUNITY
ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF FREDERICK, MD., http://www.cityoffrederick.com/Document
View.aspx?DID=1581.
97. S.B. 758, 4 30th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); see also Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene, Containment Laboratories Oversight: Hearing on S.B. 758 Before the
S. Fin. Comm., Gen. Assem., 430th Sess. (Md. Mar. 15, 2012) (testimony of the
Containment Laboratory Community Advisory Committee of Frederick, Md.), available at
http://www.cityoffrederick.com/DocumentView.aspx?DID=1582.
98. S.B. 758, § 1, Gen. Assemb., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (to be codified at MD. CODE.
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 17-602(a)(2), -703). "Containment laboratories" were defined in the
legislation to mean "any private or academic laboratory that qualifies as a Biosafety Level-3
Laboratory [i.e., working with biological agents that 'are transmitted through the air' and
'can cause a potentially serious or lethal human disease'] or a Biosafety Level-4 Laboratory
[i.e., working with biological agents that 'may be transmitted through the air' and 'pose a
high risk of life-threatening or lethal human disease for which no vaccine or therapy is
available']." S.B. 758, § 1, Gen. Assemb., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (to be codified at MD.
CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-701(c)-(e)).
99. S.B. 758, § 1, Gen. Assemb., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (to be codified at MD. CODE.
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-704).
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3. Established numerous licensing requirements for containment
laboratories in the State; 100 and
4. Required the Governor of Maryland to establish a Containment
Laboratory Advisory Committee to advise the Secretary of
DHMH on matters related to the implementation of the above-
listed provisions, and requiring that the membership of the
Advisory Committee include representatives from several State
government agencies, private and academic containment
laboratories in the State, and at least "two members of the
general public living in counties where private containment
laboratories operate."'o'
Although the Bill received an unfavorable vote in the Maryland Senate
Finance Committee,102 the concerns raised received enough interest among
legislators that DHMH "made a commitment to [the Maryland] Senate
Finance and House Health and Government Operations Committees to
establish and conduct [a Bio-Containment Laboratories Oversight
W]orkgroup to study and make recommendations regarding the State[']s
regulation of biocontainment."' 03  Entirely a DHMH administrative
initiative rather than an "official assignment" of the legislature, the
workgroup has the stated purpose of assessing "community concerns
regarding the health and safety issues associated with biosafety containment
laboratories operating in the State and to identify any gaps that may exist in
the State's regulatory oversight of these facilities" and "the potential for the
streamlining of containment laboratory regulations and the regulatory
oversight performed by State government."' 04 The workgroup is scheduled
100. S.B. 758, § 1, Gen. Assemb., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (to be codified at MD. CODE.
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 17-705 to -711).
101. S.B. 758, § 1, Gen. Assem., 430th Sess. (Md. 2012) (to be codified as MD. CODE.
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §17-712) (emphasis added).
102. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene - Containment Laboratories -
Oversight: Hearing on S.B. 758 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 4 30th Sess. (Md. 2012), available
at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2012rs/votes-comi/sb0758 fin.pdf.
103. Robert A. Myers PhD, Dir., Md. Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, Lab.
Admin., Presentation to the Bio-Containment Laboratories Oversight Workgroup 1, 5 (Oct.
2, 2012) (transcript available at http://dhnih.maryland.gov/laboratories/contaimnent/
Documents/Contaimnent%/o20Workgrp%/o20Presentation%/020(10-02-12).pdf); Courtney
Mabeus, 2 CLCAC Members on Md. Oversight Committee, FREDERICK NEWS POST, Sept. 16,
2012, www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/news/display.htm?StorylD=140784; Md. Dep't
of Health & Mental Hygiene, Biocontainment Laboratories Oversight Workgroup, (last
visited Feb. 26, 2013), http://dhmh.maryland.gov/laboratories/contaimnent/SitePages/
Home.aspx.
104. Myers, supra note 103, at 5-6.
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to meet four times between October 2012 and April 2013 and will report its
recommendations to the Maryland Senate Finance Committee and House
Health and Government Operations Committee by June 30, 2013.105
b. Examples of Local Law: Massachusetts
Because the Frederick County CLCAC and the Maryland work group are
creations of administrative actions rather than of legislative acts, they are
examples of community participation being adopted as a matter of local and
state administrative policy rather than as a matter of law. The City of
Boston, Massachusetts, on the other hand, has adopted community
participation as a matter of law in its local codes and regulations relating to
research on biological agents that pose a threat to public health and safety.
These local legal authorities require the establishment of advisory
committees with representation from local government, scientists familiar
with the research being regulated, and "residents of neighborhoods which
are or may be impacted" by the research being regulated. 0 6  They also
require entities conducting regulated research to form institutional biosafety
committees ("IBCs") that include among their members community
representatives "with no financial interest in the entity, from the community
in which the laboratory is located or abutting communities." 0 7 IBCs are to
hold at least one public meeting each year in which "the type and nature of
the biological research" conducted at the entity is reviewed before the
105. Id. at 6, 8; Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, Biocontainment Workgroup
Meetings, (last visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://dhmih.maryland.gov/laboratories/contaimnent/
SitePages/Meetings.aspx.
106. Bos. MASS. MUN. CODE §§ 17-9.1(c)(2) & 17-9.3 (establishing a Boston
Biohazards Connittee in recognition of "the need for community and scientific input to
assist [local authorities] in carrying out their duties and responsibilities in regulating
Recombinant DNA research, production and technology"); Bos. PUB. HEALTH COMM'N
REG., BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY REGULATIONS §3.04 (establishing a Boston Biosafety
Commiittee to be "composed of both scientific and community representatives to assist in
regulating biological laboratories at BSL-3 and 4"); Bos. PUB. HEALTH COMM'N KEG.,
GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF BOSTON PUBLIC HEALTH
COMMISSION'S BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY REGULATION 15-16 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/regulations/Forms%/ 2 0%/2ODocuments/guidelines LabReg.pdf
[hereinafter Bos. PUB. HEALTH COMM'N KEG., GUIDELINES FOR BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY
REGULATION].
107. Bos. PUB. HEALTH COMM'N KEG., BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY REGULATIONS
§2.03(a); Bos. PUB. HEALTH COMM'N KEG., GUIDELINES FOR BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY
REGULATION, supra note 106, at 8; See also Bos. MASS., MUN. CODE §§ 17-9.1(e) (requiring
in part that institutional biosafety committees ("IBCs") at laboratories using recombinant
DNA in Boston "include at least one representative of the local community approved by the
Commiissioner and at least one non-doctoral person from the laboratory technical staff.").
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public. 0
Several other local jurisdictions in Massachusetts have established
similar biosafety committees that include representation from the
community in their respective membership rosters. 109
VI. AN INNOVATION IN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: ENCOURAGING SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS AND PROMOTING PUBLIC WELFARE SIMULTANEOUSLY
Critics and proponents of public participation in government policy-
making have acknowledged the role that the law can play either as a hedge
against the "threat" of over-reliance on public participation or as a promoter
of the "asset" of community involvement in public decision-making. For
example, Professor Cross has argued that:
So long as public perception is so centrally tainted by cognitive
limitations and biased or incomplete information ... it cannot sensibly
serve as the foundation of a risk control policy. The legal system must
devise structures that minimize biasing influences of public perception
and shift to greater use of regulation grounded in scientific data. This
means that government policy of regulation and warning must become
more strictly dependent upon the probabilistic reality of risks and not just
upon public perception of these risks. "o
As mentioned in Part V(A), however, Professor Cross also has
acknowledged that public perceptions and value judgments cannot be
entirely ignored in governmental risk control policy."' This is particularly
true where the risks in question impact the public's welfare at the
community and individual levels, or the so-called "lifeplace" in which "an
individual performs daily tasks and feels a connection to the local ecology"
so that the individual "identifies with [it] and considers [it] home [.]"11 2 A
108. Bos. PUB. HEALTH COMM'N REG., BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY REGULATIONS
§2.03(c); Bos. PUB. HEALTH COMM'N REG., GUIDELINES FOR BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY
REGULATION, supra note 106, at 8-9.
109. See supra note 33. These local jurisdictions include the City of Cambridge and the
Towns of Amherst, Bedford, Belmont, and Tewksbury. Many biomedical research
institutions and biotechnology companies are located in these localities. See generally,
Massachusetts Biotechnology Council, Membership Directory, available at
http://www.nassbio.org/menbership/menibership directory.
110. Cross, supra note 58, at 968-69.
111. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
112. Derek Bayne, Bioregionalism and Environmental Regulation: A Policy
Consideration for Future Environmental Reforms, 17 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3 (citations
omitted) (citing ROBERT L. THAYER, JR., LIFE PLACE: BIOREGIONAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE
6 (2003)).
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prime example of such a risk would be those experienced by communities
that surround facilities that conduct dangerous scientific research.
Three decades ago, Professor Barry R. Furrow proposed that private tort
remedies might be a good way for members of the community to regulate
the hazards of modem scientific research, arguing that "common law
nuisance entitlements can be redefined to cope with the risks of modem
science and technology, then coupled with the use of complex injunctive
decrees to provide a prophylactic means of governing hazard[," while also
"provid[ing] an existing mechanism for asserting a risk-averse approach to
new scientific and technological activities."1 13 Although the purpose of this
argument was to introduce public value judgments to regulation and public
decision-making in a rational and organized fashion, a more direct (and less
adversarial) form of public participation in regulating community hazards
associated with dangerous research better serves the interest of protecting
the public's general welfare." 4  Decision-makers in the emergency
management community appear to agree with this more direct approach and
have urged state and especially local governments to engage community
partners in the public, private, non-profit, and faith-based sectors in their
emergency management and preparedness activities."
Enhanced communication and collaboration between scientists,
government officials, and the lay public provides the best way to ensure that
scientific research on dangerous biological agents intended to promote and
protect the public's welfare is conducted in a way that also promotes and
protects the public's welfare. Such multi-stakeholder interfacing provides a
mechanism for scientists to better grasp the human and societal implications
of their work and to better understand and empathize with the communities
in which they work, for government officials to make informed decisions,
and for community members to express their concerns and to learn how
some of these concerns may be misplaced. Incorporating such multi-
113. Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U.
PA. L. REV. 1403, 1466 (1983).
114. Nuisance suits are also notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to win, given the
numerous elements and sub-elements necessary to make a prima facie case. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-28 (1979); and George P. Smith, Re-Validating
The Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687 (2005).
115. U.S. DEPT' OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THREAT AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND
RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDE: COMPREHENSIVE PREPAREDNESS GUIDE (CPG) 201 9-10 (Apr.
2012), available at www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=5823 ("As the impacts of a
threat or hazard affect more than the public sector, the jurisdiction should work with their
whole community partners, including the private and nonprofit sectors and faith-based
organizations, to gain a full understanding of all of the impacts to the community."); Public
Health Preparedness Capabilities, supra note 12, at 16-26 ("Community Preparedness" and
"Community Recovery").
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stakeholder interfacing into the planning, decision-making, and policy-
making processes arguably yields more robust plans, policies, and laws that
are responsive to all aspects of public welfare.
Multi-stakeholder interfacing can be strengthened if supported by public
policies with enforcing legal structures. Legislative acts or executive
regulations similar to those from Boston and other Massachusetts
localities" 6 would give administrative policy practices such as those from
Maryland"'7 greater legitimacy as a democratic means to ensure that public
welfare is protected through the regulation of DURC and other risky
biomedical research occurring in communities. The legal structure
provided by such acts and regulations also gives potency to such policy
practices by effectively operationalizing the philosophical principles of
public participation in ways that can be observed, evaluated, and modified
(through subsequent legislative or regulatory amendments) if needed. In
this way, legal tools can be used innovatively to harness a fundamental
principle of democracy into an often under-utilized (if not entirely new)
public policy strategy to address a modem (and relatively new) public
health and safety issue of significant concern to communities throughout
the United States and the world.
VII. CONCLUSION
With the continuing societal burdens posed by infectious diseases and the
continuing threat of bioterrorism around the world, scientists have a
compelling motive to continue investigating highly pathogenic diseases in
the laboratory. However, scientists conducting such research need to better
understand the implications of their research on members of the public,
especially those living in the communities in which they work, as well as
the legitimate interests of government officials to protect and promote
public health and safety. Greater interfacing between scientists,
government officials, and the lay public during planning, decision-making,
and policy-making processes in areas of common concern can yield plans,
policies, and laws that better protect all aspects of the public's welfare.
Community-based participatory planning, decision-making, and policy-
making can serve as a mediator between the interests of scientific
advancement and public welfare, and laws and policies that facilitate such
multi-stakeholder interfacing can facilitate the alignment of these interests.
While such an environment can be difficult to establish, its value can be
measured with each safely-developed medical countermeasure that prevents
116. See Part V(D)(2)(b), supra.
117. See Part V(D)(2)(a), supra.
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or treats a probable future worldwide pandemic.
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